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A critique of the ontology of consumer enchantment
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ABSTRACT
The concept of enchantment offers a plausible explanation of the lures and thrills of consumer culture. We examine the theoretical foundation
of the concept through a critique of Ritzer’s enchantment thesis. We begin by assessing the enchantment/disenchantment discourse through a
review of the main theoretical contributions to the area, first summarizing Max Weber’s initial outline of the notion of disenchantment in the
Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism.We then consider Colin Campbell’s critique of Weber and George Ritzer’s development in Enchanting
a Disenchanted World. Finally, we apply Jean Baudrillard’s Order of Simulacra to further resolve some of the open questions concerning the
possibility of enchantment in contemporary consumer culture. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Our objective in this paper is to critically review a prevailing
discourse within consumption studies regarding the role and
definition of enchantment. This discourse builds upon sev-
eral well-theorized arguments regarding social change, social
futures (Lee, 2010) and cultural transition. Modern industrial
societies can be described as disenchanted worlds in that they
are characterized as having limited and peripheral space for
enchantment, such as magic, religion, mysticism and wonder
(Weber, 1905/2002). This modernity is instead characterized
by a loss and rejection of enchantment, through a dominance
of scientific, rational and economic discourse. Modernity is
thus defined as a loss, rejection or movement away from an
enchanted world to one that is disenchanted. One of the
responses to this disenchanted, rationalized world is to seek
to re-enchant it in some way (Ritzer, 2010), and this, some
have argued, is a core motivation and explanation of
consumer culture. Consumption can be said to constitute an
attempt to rediscover the enchanting potential within culture
(Firat and Venkatesh, 1995) or, as Ritzer (2010) famously
articulated, to ‘enchant a disenchanted world’. Our main
objective here is to continue the critical dialogue around
Ritzer’s enchantment thesis, evaluating the plausibility of
the implicit claim that consumer culture can be re-enchanted
(see, for example, Numerato 2009; Denegri-Knott and Zwick
2012). If re-enchantment is achievable and indeed desirable
for consumers and organizations, then further questions are
raised regarding the ontological status of this re-enchant-
ment, and whether this represents some kind of return to a
set of cultural values and practices that were lost through
the process of modernity or whether this re-enchantment is
in fact just another manifestation of disenchantment (Jenkins,
2000). To address these questions, we begin by assessing the
enchantment/disenchantment discourse through a review and
summary of some of the main theoretical contributions to the
area. We begin by summarizing Weber’s initial outline of the
notion of disenchantment and then move on to consider first
Campbell’s (1987) and then Ritzer’s (2010) development
and reaction to the Weberian thesis. We then move on to
consider the potential application of Baudrillard’s (1993) Or-
der of Simulacra to further understand and perhaps resolve
some of the open questions concerning the possibility of en-
chantment in contemporary consumer culture. This opens up
a space in which we can frame current debates about en-
chantment as forms of simulation that are at once consistent
with a disenchanted world while appearing to stand in con-
trast to it.
ENCHANTING A DISENCHANTED WORLD?
Critically orientated explanations of consumer culture have
frequently utilized the concept of disenchantment to account
for aspects of contemporary consumer society. The model
that is most commonly applied, explicitly or otherwise, is
that the onset and progress of modernity, capitalism and
industrialisation was characterized by disenchantment.
Drawing on Weber’s description of the rise of capitalism
(Weber, 1905/2002), disenchantment is used with a literal
intent, namely that the ‘enchanted’ aspects of cultural and
ideological forms (such as magic) were systematically and
radically eliminated and displaced by a rational logic.
It is plausible to suggest that a process of disenchantment
(assuming it is an accurate historical analysis) was a neces-
sary, beneficial and progressive consequence of modernity
from which numerous benefits and developments are
achieved. Reason replaces dogma, science replaces religion
and mysticism, and knowledge replaces superstition. There
is equal plausibility in the idea that this process of disen-
chantment left a legacy in which some important, beneficial
and positive aspects of social and cultural life were
suppressed, marginalized and perhaps even eradicated.
In consumer culture research, the thesis of disenchant-
ment opens up a number of interesting and competing
avenues for discussion. For those looking to develop
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critical and oppositional accounts of consumer culture, the
disenchantment discourse can be utilized to justify a view
of consumer society that is lacking in some fundamental
way. Consumer lifestyles are doomed to a certain insuffi-
ciency and inadequacy on the grounds that some
important and longed for aspects are unachievable. A life
dominated by consumption, shopping and brands is, from
this perspective, subject to criticism on the grounds that
it is deeply unfulfilling, shallow, surface level and ephem-
eral (see, for example, Winter, 2002). The disenchanted
consumer masses are also disempowered, maybe even
de-humanized as a result, and left with the possibility of
a deep sense of longing and desire (Belk et al., 2003) for
something unknown and ill-defined. Consumer culture
can be depicted as decadent, a kind of social pathology
(Brown and Reid, 1997).
An alternative, if less common place application of the
disenchantment thesis to consumer culture is the notion that
the rational, de-mystified economic social relations of
modernity enabled for the first time a more open, free and
liberated consumer landscape. Modernity brought with it
the opportunity for a rational consumer capable of evaluating
information and making choices in their own best interests
without the restrictive dogma or mysticism of prior eras to
impede the progressive development of the modern market.
Debates surrounding some of the perceived problems with
branding and brand management can be interpreted through
this perspective. Brand theory suggests that brand strategies
help to achieve efficiencies on the market by providing
guarantees of quality and standards, by enabling consumers
to make better decisions quickly and easily, and by offering
a means for organizations to transfer immaterial value be-
tween products. Brands are, in this view, a rational technol-
ogy. The counter position, however, suggests that brands
can produce market inefficiencies and consumer detriment
because they reinstate a certain kind of ‘marketing mysti-
cism’. Branding requires considerable resources to be
invested and spent, which add (unnecessary) cost, and is
predicated on the idea that attaching arbitrary signification
to what are often relatively standardized products is a
source of value. Branding strategies that prey on consumer
vulnerabilities and fears, for example, products and ser-
vices that are marketed to parents with the suggestion that
their children will be healthier and higher achievers as a
result of consumption, or financial services products that
suggest an ability to protect against an uncertain future
can be criticized for resorting to a certain ‘enchantment’
to bewitch and bedazzle the consumer. Instead of enchant-
ing brands, consumers are thus encouraged to examine the
facts as rational agents, which tend to refer to the utility of
products and services.
There is a third application of this debate that achieves
an interesting synthesis of these two oppositions. Ritzer’s
(2010) disenchantment thesis has features of both tradi-
tions in that it builds on the central belief that modernity
(and post-modernity) has a legacy that fits to Weber’s
writing on the disenchanted world. For Ritzer, modernity
is characterized by an inevitable disenchantment and has
produced a number of undesirable social, cultural and
economic consequences that have to be responded to.
Ritzer certainly does not deny the obvious achievements
of rationalization and the arguable beneficial consequences
of efficiency and standardization in consumer culture.
These include low prices, mass-market participation, con-
venience, and relatively uniform product and service
standards. Ritzer epitomizes this legacy most clearly in
the McDonaldization thesis (Ritzer, 1998) as well as with
analysis of brands such as Starbucks (Ritzer, 2011).
Consumers, however, never seem to have lost their
appetite and desire for the wondrous and the spectacular,
and organizations have sought to exploit the potential of
enchantment in order to compete in increasingly rational-
ized markets. For Ritzer, the modern consumer is not
fundamentally different to his or her pre-modern ancestor
in that they retain the same longing for enchantment, even
in this disenchanted world. To attend to this deficit modern
corporations are thus required to embark on a series of
strategies that attempt to re-enchant the modern market
place. This re-enchantment must take place alongside the
consequences of the disenchanted world rather than
replacing them. Organizations are tasked with the difficult
objective of re-enchanting product and service encounters
while continuing to achieve rational objectives of cost and
production efficiency, standardisation, and mass-market
appeal. Ritzer identifies a number of organizations, sites
and settings where these acts of ‘enchantment’ can be
seen to take place. Sites include obvious illustrations such
as theme parks, leisure cruises and casinos, as well as
slightly more mundane consumption settings and contexts
such as malls and credit. These are the ‘new cathedrals of
consumption’, which are analogous to the mediaeval
European cathedrals that characterize the pre-modern era
with a common purpose of both institutions to instil,
maintain and reproduce a sense of enchantment and
wonder.
Beyond this analogy, however, Ritzer’s application of
Weber’s notion of enchantment can be vague. The main
issue of contention concerns the relationship between the
conditions of enchantment as it existed prior to the onset
of modernity (i.e. conditions that prevailed prior to the
subsequent disenchantment) and the state of re-enchantment
as experienced in consumer cultures today (Jenkins, 2000).
Re-enchantment could be interpreted as some kind of return
to a prior cultural form, a rediscovery of a condition that once
existed but does so no longer, a motivation (to seek to be
‘enchanted’) that was once commonplace and ubiquitous,
or a kind of socio-economic process by which aspects of
experience are subject to some technology of enchantment
(Pinney and Thomas, 2001). It would seem logically
problematic to draw a direct relationship or association be-
tween that form of enchantment that pre-dates a subsequent
disenchantment and that form that is then evidenced
through the process of re-enchantment. Whatever
similarities that may exist between pre-enchantment and
re-enchantment, it is nevertheless the case that many if
not most aspects of ‘modern’ enchantment are quite differ-
ent to those that existed previously. This leads to a broader
question concerning the ontology of enchantment and, by
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so doing, enables us to consider the relevance of the enchantment
concept to modern and post-modern consumer cultures.
WEBER’S DISENCHANTMENT
The rise and dissemination of Occidental instrumental ratio-
nalism and its consequences is a central theme in Weber’s so-
ciology (1905/2002). The disenchantment of religious
superstition and myth was crucial for developing capitalism
as a mental form and the dominant way of regulating social
exchange. In Weber’s analysis, the emergence of capitalism
is closely connected to the rise of Protestantism in which
an ascetic lifestyle and salvation are closely associated, such
as in Calvinism and the association between virtue and pros-
perity. For Weber, these protestant roots, combined with the
progress of the rational sciences meant that there was a
diminished space for enchantment. While science unveiled
superstitious aspects of traditional beliefs, capitalism created
the mundane world of goods and services. This transformed
the modern world into ‘an iron cage’ of rationality, eliminat-
ing the enchanting aspects of life.
The condition identified as Enchantment in the world
prior to the Occidental instrumental rationalism was itself
culturally dynamic. In the section on Sociology of Religion
in Weber (1978: 399–634) it is described how naturalistic
magic and myths were replaced by monotheistic religions,
and this fundamentally altered the ontology of religion.
Religions based on magic and myths are less influenced by
rationalism because these religions do not have a higher
purpose. Magical events just happen, and there is no plan
for when it will happen again and only a brief connection
between the event and the single human being. Contrary to
such ‘primitive’ beliefs, monotheistic religions are guided
by prophets spelling out the higher purpose of seemingly ac-
cidental occurrences and the hidden rules or law by which
things happen. Protestantism was for Weber an ideal type
of such a religion where each individual was thought to be
accountable for his or her own salvation, and that prosperity,
success and wealth in life were its only indication. Religion
based on magic and myth represents a form of enchantment,
which is further removed from the disenchanted modern world,
with Protestantism a recent stage in between. Disenchantment
of the (Western) world is a progressive process, originating in
the Renaissance and intensified by Enlightenment and the
development of the capitalist mode of production:
Max Weber saw history as having departed a deeply
enchanted past en route to a disenchanted future—a
journey that would gradually strip the natural world both
of its magical properties and of it capacity for meaning
(Schneider, 1993: ix).
For Weber, there is a fundamental difference between
cultural conditions of the disenchanted world and the
enchanted world superseded. A key question then is to
what degree it is possible to reconstruct an enchanted
world once having been disenchanted. For many Weberian
scholars, the process of disenchantment is irreversible. As
Gane (2004) comments,
This process of disenchantment reduces law from a divine
standard that is ‘legitimated by God’s will’ to a technical,
this-worldly means of settling questions right (…) Weber
argues that there can be no foreseeable reversal of this
process and hence no return to a world governed by
natural law. The possibility of such a return, reunifying
the differentiated life-orders through reference to a
religious narrative (thereby reversing the process of
Eigengesetzlichkeit), rests on the re-enchantment of the
world and with this ‘sacrifice of the intellect’, a possibility
which remains open but which Weber rejects as nothing
more than a fantastical form of world-flight (Weltflucht)
(Gane, 2004: 41).
According to Weber, a way back to an enchanted world has
been forever lost. The process from magic and mysticism,
to Protestantism and then rationalism is one way. But
Weber’s position does not stand undisputed. There is a
dominant current in social theory, and cultural history has
stressed enchanting aspects of modernity and consumer
culture, on which Campbell’s work is central.
CAMPBELL’S ENCHANTMENT
Despite few exceptions (Sombart, 1912/1967), the traditional
explanation of the rise of capitalism has been to put focus on
the forces of production. That is also notable in Marx’s
analysis (1867/1976), as well as in Weber’s writings on the
emergence of capitalism. This focus on production and the
supply side of capitalism treated consumption either as a rel-
atively unimportant and negligible side effect of production,
or as a demand-side issue that did not take centre stage until
later phases of capitalism (Riesman, 1953; Bell, 1976). In
recent decades, this perspective has been questioned by cul-
tural historians who have highlighted the importance of
new consumption habits and imaginations in the develop-
ment of capitalism. McKendrick et al. (1982) identifies the
British consumer revolution in the 18th century as a driving
force in the industrial revolution, and Vries (1993) argues
that citizens’ new consumptive tastes in the Dutch republic
of the 17th century stimulated the development of merchant
capitalism. Studies of 19th century consumer culture stress
how the emergence of new ‘temples of consumption’ such
as the department stores (Sennett, 1978; Miller, 1981) and
world fairs (Williams, 1982) disseminated consumptive
appetites to a larger audience of labourers and clerks.
In the sociology of consumption, Campbell’s contribution
(1987) is seminal for understanding the origins of modern
consumption and its enchanting qualities. As a reply to We-
ber’s analysis, Campbell investigates the counter side of as-
ceticism, namely how the restraints implied in self-control
increases the awareness of the sensual and emotional sides
of the body. Renunciation arouses the senses and draws at-
tention to the body as a locus of pleasure and fantasies. As
an unintended consequence, individuals began to perceive
themselves as sensitive beings, thereby emphasizing the im-
portance of subjective experiences, imaginations and feelings
(Jantzen et al. 2012). This sensitivity reached a climax in
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Romanticism where experiences, spontaneity and sensuality
are defined as positive values against Rationalism, which was
criticized for being barren and hostile towards human nature.
For Campbell, the ‘spirit’ of consumerism is the logical
counterpart to the spirit of capitalism, ‘rendered necessary
by the institutionalized split between production and con-
sumption and the associated need to pattern activities without
recourse to the guidance of tradition’ (Campbell, 1983: 293).
The emergence of modern consumerism is an independent
factor of modernization, arising simultaneously with the pro-
cess of industrialization. This implies that the ethics of Prot-
estantism is more than just an ethics of production that
disenchants the world. The Puritan preoccupation with the
right use of the body is, from the start, also an ethics of con-
sumption. It does not exterminate lusts or extinguish drives
but diverts these towards sensitivity. Pleasure is not caused
by the satisfaction of needs but by the fulfilment of a desire
that stems from the individuals’ imagination, which is fuelled
by reticence and abstinence. This desire and these imagina-
tions were advanced because the Puritans tried to conceal
sensuality from public life. Attempts at controlling emotions
refined sensitivity. There is no absolute distinction between
self-actualization and self-control. Campbell states that by
fulfilling the duty to serve the self, the Protestant individual
would be gratified by experiencing happiness:
Heaven in such a doctrine is the fulfilment of self, hell the
subjugation of the self to constraining demands of custom
and convention; hence not rationalizing self-denying
activity but consistent self-gratificatory activity becomes
a revolutionary force (Campbell, 1983: 293).
The origins of modern consumer enchantment are located
in Puritanism and its renunciation of all worldly exuberance.
Moreover, by distinguishing between a traditional and a
modern form of hedonism, Campbell (1987) stresses the
imaginative aspects of modern enchantment. In its traditional
form, the hedonist tried to obtain pleasure by choosing ob-
jects which would arouse the senses, and pleasure was a sim-
ple sensory response to a pleasing stimulus. In contrast, the
modern form of hedonism relies much more on imagination.
Pleasure is not so much based on actual experiences with the
object but to a larger degree on the self-gratifying meanings
individuals can produce about the object. Individuals can
long for absent and unattainable objects, they can envision
the object completely differently from how it really is and
they can even abstain from using the object of desire. Desire
is not so much for things but for the experience of desire, em-
bedded in emergent emotional regimes (Jantzen et al. 2012).
The modern consumer has become a skilled manipulator of
his own impressions and sensations. He or she has become
a ‘dream-artist’ (Boden and Williams, 2002) who has learned
to control the world of objects and to modulate their own
feelings and senses in order to optimize pleasure. The split
between production and consumption in early modernity thus
both favoured a spirit of modern capitalism leading to rational-
ized, disenchanted capitalism as analysed by Weber and a
‘spirit’ of modern consumerism leading to romantic enchanted
capitalism as analysed by Campbell. It differs from enchant-
ment in traditional societies because it emanates from the
individuals’ self-actualizing endeavours and by relying cru-
cially on this self’s work of imagination. As stated by Ritzer
(2010: 64), ‘The idea of phantasmagoria is crucial to under-
standing the new means of consumption as enchanted worlds.’
RITZER: ENCHANTING A DISENCHANTED WORLD
Weber’s notion of rationalism is the foundation for Ritzer’s
(2010) analysis of the new means of consumption as the
driver in enchanting a disenchanted world. Ritzer builds
on Campbell’s analysis of the enchanting aspects of
Romanticism in consumer culture, drawing direct lines
between the religious enchantment and enchantment
created by consumption. Ritzer defines the enchanted
consumption environment as
The new means of consumption can be seen as ‘cathedrals
of consumption’—that is, they are structured, often
successfully, to have an enchanted, sometimes even
sacred, religious character…As is the case with religious
cathedrals, the cathedrals of consumption are not only
enchanted, they are also highly rationalized. As they
attract more and more consumers, their enchantment must
be reproduced over and over on demand (Ritzer, 2010: 7).
Ritzer does more than simply develop and build on
Weber. The McDonaldization thesis and Enchanting a Dis-
enchanted World recast the Weberian Spirit of Capitalism
as a sociology of consumption to such an extent that what
many consumer researchers now understand as Weberian
theory is more accurately a theory by Ritzer albeit informed
by a certain reading of Weber. In Weber’s Spirit of Capital-
ism, consumption and the consumer are minor consider-
ations. For Weber, consumption is only really considered in
terms of how Protestant asceticism regulates and restricts a
prior existing ‘organic’ consumption:
This worldly Protestant asceticism, as we may recapitulate
up to this point, acted powerfully against the spontaneous
enjoyment of possessions; it restricted consumption,
especially of luxuries. On the other hand, it had the
psychological effect of freeing the acquisition of goods
from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics. It broke the
bonds of the impulse of acquisition in that it not only
legalized it, but looked upon it as directly willed by God.
(Weber, 1905/2002: 27).
There is no real possibility of enchantment in the modern
world according to Weber’s analysis, and it is only through
Campbell’s extension and critique that the possibility of en-
chantment in consumer culture is developed. Ritzer therefore
presents a direct challenge to Weber’s conclusion rather than
adapting it, finding that ‘Despite Weber’s pessimism, en-
chantment persists’ (Ritzer, 2010: 69). This version of Weber
is broadly accurate, although Weber does allude to at least
the possibility of futures that exceed rationalism and ‘special-
ists without spirit’. In the final paragraphs of The Spirit of
Capitalism, Weber contemplates the prospect that there will
be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals someday, but if such
a rebirth is to come about, which is by no means likely, it will
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do so out with the boundaries and terms of the modern spirit
of capitalism. In Ritzer’s ontology of enchantment, however,
the new means of consumption are not only rationalized and
disenchanted, but also enchanted.
For Ritzer, and contrary to Weber, the capitalist system
of production has been able to re-enchant the world as fast
as it has been disenchanted. Ritzer’s (2010) direct compari-
son between the cathedrals of consumption and the cathe-
drals associated with organized religions is evident in
choice of terms that describe consumer pilgrimages and
worship at these ‘new means of consumption’. However,
the continuing potential for disenchantment and rationaliza-
tion is an ever-present possibility:
The idea of cathedrals of consumption emphasizes that
these settings are characterized by the enchantment
needed to lure consumers, although disenchantment is
an ever-present possibility as a result of the process of
rationalization (Ritzer, 2010: 8–9).
The cultural condition prior to the process of disenchantment
was not involved in rationalization processes, and therefore,
the risk of disenchantment was absent in pre-modern societies.
It is a cultural condition characterized by what Baudrillard
defines as symbolic exchange and Pawlett (2007) presents as
‘a form or principle, rather than as the specific “content” of
cultural practices (p. 48)’. Changes in this kind of culture are
primarily caused by physical and demographic factors, not
by mental structures associated with the rationalization
process. Ideas about the absence of the potential for disen-
chantment and rationalization in pre-modern cultures that
Ritzer derives from Baudrillard are not problematic:
However, in this work, re-enchantment will be viewed as an
on going and very real development within the contemporary
cathedrals of consumption. It constitutes the way out of the
dilemma posed by the disenchantment of the world in general
and other means of consumption in particular. To continue
to attract, control, and exploit consumers, the cathedrals of
consumption undergo a continual process of re-enchantment
(Ritzer, 2010: 69–70).
The process of re-enchantment is based on a rationalization
where the level of enchantment connected to a given cathedral
of consumption is monitored, evaluated and improved in order
to achieve maximum optimisation. When the level or degree
of enchantment is inadequate (fewer customers and less
money spent), the means of consumption must be re-
enchanted. For this line of reasoning to remain consistent, it
is necessary to first accept and incorporate a particular ontol-
ogy of enchantment, one that is essentially historical and
linear in character. In this ontology, we can identify the
procession from a state (or states) of enchantment, to a state
of disenchantment and then to re-enchantment.
A BAUDRILLARDIAN CRITIQUE OF THE ONTOLOGY
OF ENCHANTMENT
Ritzer uses the enchantment concept both for religious en-
chantment and the enchantment produced by the new means
of consumption. Baudrillard’s (1993) theory of the ‘three or-
ders of simulacra’ describing the cultural development from
the Renaissance onwards can be used to mediate between
Weber’s rejection of enchantment in capitalism and Ritzer’s
enchanted world. Baudrillard’s writing is infused with dis-
course that invokes concepts that can be easily associated
with ideas of (re)enchantment Ritzer (2010: 69). In this con-
text, Baudrillard’s theories are perhaps best thought of in
terms of radical re-enchantment or even catastrophic revenge
in post-industrial society. Thus, Baudrillard (2001:11) speaks
of impossible exchange as the illusion or phantasm that lurks
behind all value systems and representations of an objective
and rational world.
In the progression of simulacra, the order of imitation is
superseded by the order of production, which is then super-
seded by the order of simulation. In broad terms, the first or-
der of simulacra corresponds to Weber’s enchanted world,
and the second order, to that of industrial production and
the world disenchanted through rationality. Baudrillard de-
scribes how cultural conditions for discourse and representa-
tion have changed in European history from the Middle Ages
and beyond, and the ways that people have attached different
meanings to their intentions and actions throughout history.
Baudrillard’s point of departure is a cultural condition based
on what he calls ‘symbolic exchange’. This condition charac-
terizes so-called primitive cultures where an immediate
meaning of life exists through the individual’s place in a sta-
ble and reciprocal social order. In a European context, the
Middle Ages broadly represents the kind of cultural condi-
tion that Baudrillard terms the symbolic.
Baudrillard’s theory of the three orders of simulacra is an
attempt to analyse the cultural changes societies have been
subject to since they left the original symbolic order. Here,
it is important to note that the empirical reality of the kind
of societies mentioned earlier is not central. The idea of for-
mer kinds of societies is part of defining a present cultural
condition. The order of imitation is a concept of how
Western culture has developed since the decline of archaic
religions towards the end of The Middle Ages and the emer-
gence of the Renaissance. This altered culture fundamentally.
The single human being no longer understands himself as
having a binding and unbreakable relationship to God, and
understanding of reality in culture changes. The former ep-
och can be said to be determined by a symbolic order, build-
ing on obligation and reciprocity, despite the principle
differences between human beings. The order of imitation
changes this. Signs are no longer bound to (and hence
obliged by) one specific relation but set free. By being loos-
ened from their connection to a specific referent, one can
construct new cultural meanings. This relationship can be
regarded as the condition for the self-conscious individual,
the emergence of the bourgeoisie and science as an institu-
tion. This causes that the single individual relates to reason
and humanity; that citizens can use clothes as signs to create
fashion; and that science can study the world as an object,
and independent of God and human beings. The individual
imitates reason and humanity when it has to define itself;
the citizen imitates the aristocracy when they choose their
style in clothes; science finds that true results imitate nature.
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Because of the signs’ imitative quality, this is called the order
of imitation: Signs imitate something, which is perceived as
being real. Here in the origins of simulacra, that is, the indi-
vidual’s essence, the Social and Nature only exist as imagi-
nations that can be regarded as an effect of a culture
disconnecting the ‘natural’ order of signs and their referents.
The order of production according to Baudrillard relates
to the emergence of classic capitalism, breaking with princi-
ples in the order of imitation. In the analysis of this new
epoch, Baudrillard relies on Marxist economic theory. Ana-
lysis of the logic of capitalism is eminent, but for Baudrillard,
Marxist theory does not progress beyond the basic images of
classic economy, that is, the capacity for work and the nature
of demands. Marx sees capitalism as a historical and social
institution that has emerged at a given time and which is
not a natural part of the world. In Baudrillard’s scheme,
capitalism is a semiotic system governed by a specific logic.
It is a new way in which orders of simulacra are organized,
which in turn redefines value.
With capitalism, exchange value becomes central, and what
previously could be regarded as exploitation and real opposi-
tions disappear because everything can be equated in the logic
of exchange value. Any reference to something real (which still
was very much present in and with imitation) disappears, and
only the logic of the exchange value is left. Production is no
longer carried out to reach a specific goal. Instead, production
serves the purpose of perpetually giving fuel to the system’s
own reproduction. All actions within this system are directed
towards fulfilling the system’s own logic. Baudrillard here uses
the automaton as a metaphor for the way human beings func-
tion in this system. Through rationalization, goods and value
are mass-produced, leading to the impression of accumulation
of ever more goods. The whole culture becomes organized
around reproducing a system as efficiently as possible, and this
logic becomes the mainstay of culture, in that any references to
a condition before capitalism have evaporated. Thus, the world
and culture is disenchanted, with any link to a natural law of
value replaced by a common and single form of exchange
value defined in solely economic terms.
This second order of simulacra broadly corresponds to
the Industrial Revolution, and as Butler points out, this is
only an intermediate period in Baudrillard’s theory (Bulter,
1999: 37). It separates via discontinuity the era of symbolic
exchange and its reestablishment as seduction and simula-
tion. This third order, of simulation, succeeds the order of
production, and order radically reorganizes the way in
which signs function in culture. The pure reproduction of
the system and the infinite exchanges of equivalent signs
do not constitute a sufficient foundation for culture.
Throughout the order of imitation and production, the refer-
ence of the sign as something originally binding and
thereby symbolic disappeared. Instead, a new kind of
culture emerged where obligation and reciprocity are
simulated. For Baudrillard, the transition from the order of
imitation to the order of production was not as distinct as
the transition from the order of production to the order of
simulation. Imitation and production are treated as transi-
tional periods from an initial state termed the symbolic to
the final (contemporary) state of simulation.
By the order of simulation, classic economy is brought to
an end. The goods produced no longer refer to use value (as
in the order of imitation) or to exchange value (as in the order
of production), but to a sign value having ‘the structural play
of value’ (Baudrillard, 1993: 6) as reference. This means that
signs refer to signs that again refer to signs. This perpetual
reference, however, does not take place without a certain
structural coherence. There is no longer any reference to a
reality external to the exchange of signs. Signs mutate by a
continuing communication with other signs. Sign value
emerges in ‘the genesis of simulacra’ (Baudrillard, 1993:
57). The sign value is yielded by a program, which in turn
is governed by a code. This model precedes what is yielded.
In the order of simulation, new models are continuously gen-
erated giving the signs the possibility to mutate into new sign
values. The very idea is that the sign no longer has any fixed
reference and that the referent disappears. It is the basic
theme constituting the core in the order of simulation.
Today we know that it is at the level of reproduction (fashion,
the media, advertising, information and communication
networks), at the level of what Marx rather carelessly
called the faux frais of capital (immense historical irony!),
that is, in the sphere of simulacra and the code, that the
unity of the whole process of capital is formed
(Baudrillard, 1993: 56).
Here it is shown that all those aspects of organization and
management that fall outside classic economy’s perception
of what is essential in the order of production are aspects that
the marketing discipline deals with. Marketing can be
regarded as that part of economy that specializes in Marx’s
‘faux frais’ that refers to ‘incidental operating expenses’
incurred in the productive investment of capital, which do
not in themselves add new value to output. This process can
be regarded as an example of what Baudrillard characterizes
as the model determining what is produced and what meaning
the product acquires. According to Baudrillard, this model
precedes what is produced. There is a program for what is
produced, and this program is governed by a code. In the
order of imitation and production, it was anticipated that
the code determining the meaning of the signs refers to
something given such as a stable social order or the neces-
sity to reproduce. In the order of simulation, the code no
longer refers to something real but only to its own logic.
By seeing this in the light of the marketing orientation, the
code’s logic is identical with the logic of the marketing
orientation: Every company must constantly keep itself
informed about what the customers want and deliver the
product at the place and time where the consumers want
it, with the design they want, at the price they want. This
program that the marketing orientation puts on the agenda
becomes a model, as Baudrillard defines it.
DISENCHANTMENT AS SIMULATED
ENCHANTMENT
Baudrillard’s focus is on cultural conditions for meaning
construction after the Middle Ages. In the mediaeval
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universe, the cultural reference was placed outside the culture
itself, in a deity. This era can be compared to Weber’s
‘original’ state of enchantment, which was disenchanted by
rationality. Prior to the emergence of the order of imitation
meaning was represented by reference to something tran-
scendent to culture, and the Renaissance introduced reason
and humanity as something the individual must possess.
The individual is defined as imitating these two concepts,
and reason and humanity become the guarantee for
meanings. From a Weberian perspective, this is the first step
in the disenchantment process, whereas for Baudrillard, it
represents just another kind of re-enchantment because this
new foundation (in reason and humanity) is not understood
as a construct but taken as a natural relationship. For
Baudrillard this is a simulacrum: a ‘truth’ concealing that
no definite truth exists. It could also be described as the
enchantment of reason, which is taken to provide the
meaning of life. In the Weberian tradition the capitalistic
mode of production is both a source of disenchantment and
re-enchantment. For Baudrillard this is the order of produc-
tion and the transformation from use value to exchange
value. This transformation is crucial because Baudrillard
perceives the order of production as a semiotic system based
on the exchange value. Mass-produced goods gain new
meaning as they are transposed into new exchange contexts;
signs are detached as a result of the order of production.
Because culture does not operate with meaningless signs, this
process opens the possibility of attaching new meaning to
signs.
The order of simulation marks the end of a traditional con-
ception of society and economy in that the goods provided
by production refer to neither use value (as in the order of im-
itation) nor exchange value (as in the order of production),
but to a sign value gaining its reference differently from what
had existed under the former orders. Enchantment is no lon-
ger transcendent to human existence but immanent in social
life. It becomes a man made construction and man is aware
of that. It is a ‘second order’ enchantment. As a consequence,
it is what we might term a ‘second order’ enchantment. That
is, enchantment publicly recognized as enchantment and
overtly produced and consumed in order to lure, attract and
fascinate. This cultural logic us completely different from
mediaeval enchantment. In this second order enchantment,
consumers know they are surrounded by enchanting objects.
This cultural condition is also a premise for the experience
economy (e.g. Pine and Gilmore, 1999) because this phe-
nomenon is characterized by the construction of enchantment
beyond what can be connected to the branded object. In the
order of simulation, everything is constructed with the
purpose of signification and attraction. This mode of
enchantment requires a new understanding of experiential
consumer behaviour.
Both Weber and Baudrillard address an original cultural
condition where an initial, ‘authentic’ enchantment was pres-
ent. For Weber, this pristine enchantment has gone forever
since the beginning of the disenchantment processes of mo-
dernity. Baudrillard describes this pristine enchantment as a
culture based on symbolic exchange and asserts that such
culture based on reciprocity and obligation has been the
premise for any culture whether real or simulated. In the
order of imitation, enchantment is no longer a natural founda-
tion for culture. Instead, the monotheistic God became the
transcendent foundation for culture. In Protestantism, the
relationship to God changed, and it became a duty for
the single individual to establish a personal relationship to
religion and to reject ritualism and mysticism. This change
in focus continues the ideas of the Renaissance, where reason
and humanity prescribe how human beings should be consti-
tuted. In the transition from Catholicism to the Renaissance
and Protestantism, the model for enchantment changed from a
focus on the unquestionable rituals to un-reflected belief in the
individual determined by reason and humanity. Enchantment
is here constituted by a model where individuals imitate the
unquestioned ideas of reason, humanity and science.
Baudrillard’s order of production corresponds to Weber’s
era of disenchantment, but it could also be interpreted as an
era of a new kind of enchantment or what might be termed
a form of ‘enchanted disenchantment’. The order of produc-
tion generates belief in progress and in a better future based
on mass-produced goods in rationalized capitalist system.
Everything is transformed into exchange value, and because
of the enchanted atmosphere, the consequences are obscured.
What was left of the use value is repressed, and the sign is no
longer obliged by history and tradition. Goods are bestowed
with new meaning, and citizens can acquire goods that were
earlier retained for aristocracy. The sumptuary laws from the
17th century, which prohibited this kind of imitation, were
abolished, and instead, the mass-produced goods overflowed
society, and this trickle-down effect could not be stopped.
The availability of cheap mass-produced goods was itself
an enchanting moment, and even Marx was enchanted by
the disenchantment when he critiqued commodity fetishism
and identified capitalism as the second highest level of devel-
opment of the human societies. The order of simulation is
based on the sign detached from history and tradition. Signs
continue to determine meaning as they float within culture,
but this meaning is no longer determined by a stable framework
but instead constructed by marketing-oriented companies on the
basis of market research and strategic decision. These are the
means of enchanted consumption. Individuals in consumer
culture know that they are confronted with constructed
enchantments when they shop, buy, dream and consume.
Our analysis has highlighted the need to think beyond
fixed categories of enchantment and disenchantment.
Contemporary consumer cultures should certainly not be
understood as a return to enchanted worlds akin to those of
Weber’s pre-industrialized, pre-modern world or Baudrillard’s
symbolic exchange, but nor is it the case that they are disen-
chanted worlds either. In contrast to Ritzer, we suggest that a
disenchanted world cannot be re-enchanted in terms of some
kind of return or reinstatement of values, which many have
existed previously. However, in support of Ritzer, we also sug-
gest that disenchantment is not total or complete and that many
of the forces of disenchantment were and are themselves rich in
enchanting potential. Consumer cultures are not totally disen-
chanted worlds where enchantment is but a historical memory.
Consumer cultures produce and reproduce and simulate en-
chantment and disenchantment, perhaps at ever accelerating
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rates and in roughly equal measure, and it is this process of re-
production or simulation that requires further analysis rather
than the states themselves. Both enchantment and disenchant-
ment imply some nominal cultural referent to a stable cultural
order, and this, for Baudrillard, is what has disappeared in
consumer culture, as Ritzer notes, ‘the enchanted world of
symbolic exchange continually haunts, and poses a threat to,
the modern disenchanted world of economic exchange’
(Ritzer, 2010, 73). What remain and re-appear are systems of
signified disenchantment and enchantment bound together only
as signs of one another, produced and reproduced (simulated)
within consumer culture and consumer identity.
There is a certain irony in using Baudrillard’s theories to
counteract a discourse of cultural alienation and rationalization
because for many commentators Baudrillard’s ideas are essen-
tially nihilistic and without progressive potential. Ritzer’s
contribution illustrates how simulated enchantment can be
observed and critiqued through the lens of conventional social
theory, but this does not account for the other side of the
bargain, namely the production of simulated disenchantment
that is more than simply a reflected version of extreme rational-
ization. Baudrillard, we conclude, does offer several versions of
something that comes close to a form of ‘simulated’ disen-
chantment, represented across several recurring concepts and
ideas. One idea that comes closest to what wemight understand
as ‘total’ simulated disenchantment in Baudrillard is Absolute
Evil, understood as that which is necessarily produced from
an ‘unchecked proliferation of Good’ (Baudrillard, 2010:
109). This idea is a feature of Baudrillard’s later writings where
‘relative good and evil’ has become eclipsed by a totalitarian
morality in which infinite progress and development produces
a banalized and neutralized world continually shattered by the
unpredictable and terrorizing event. Baudrillard offers a vision
of a logical and inevitable trajectory that leads ‘beyond’
enchantment and simulation to a culture of the event and of
terror. Good continually folds in on itself to become its oppo-
site. Global power, Baudrillard concludes, has not and cannot
have any symbolic response to such events, exposing an
immense symbolic powerlessness and impotence.
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